Abstract. The concept of ring signature was introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman. This signature is considered to be a simplified group signature from which identity of signer is ambiguous although verifier knows the group to which signer belong. In this paper we introduce a new proxy ring signature scheme. 
Introduction
Consider the following situation discussed by Zhang et al. in [10] An entity delegate his signing capability to many proxies, called proxy signers set. Any proxy signer can perform the signing operation of the original entity. These proxy signers want to sign messages on behalf of the original entity while providing anonymity. Of course, this problem can be solved by group signature (Take the group manager as the original entity). But in some applications, it is necessary to protect the privacy of participants (we believe that unconditional anonymity is necessary in many occasions). If the proxies don't hope that some one (include the original signer) can open their identities, the group signature is not suitable in here (Because a group manager can open the signature to reveal the identity of the signer).
To solve above problem proxy ring signature scheme was introduced by Zhang et al [10] . In this paper, we propose a new proxy ring signature scheme based on Lin-Wu's [9] ID-based ring signature scheme from bilinear pairing. As compared to previous scheme [10] , our scheme is computationally more efficient, especially for the pairing operations required during signature verification.
Preliminaries

-Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, and G2 bea cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q: A bilinear pairing is a map e : G 1 × G 1 −→ G 2 with the following properties: P1: Bilinear : e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab ;
P2: Non-degenerate: There exists P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1; P3: Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 . When the DDHP (Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem) is easy but the CDHP (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) is hard on the group G; we call G a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group. Such groups can be found on supersingular elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves over finite field, and the bilinear parings can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairing. We can refer to [7, 10] for more details. Through this paper, we define the system parameters in all schemes are as follows: Let P be a generator of G 1 ; the bilinear pairing is given by e :
-Paring based short signature scheme (PBSSS) Boneh et al.'s pairing based short signature scheme is as followsKey Generation Choose a random number s ∈ Z * q and compute P P ub = sP where (G 1 , G 2 , q, P, P P ub , H 2 ) are public parameter and s is the secret key. Signing For a message m ∈ 0, 1 * , compute P m = H 2 (m) ∈ G 1 ,. Then S m = sP m is the signature on message m. Verification Check whether the following equation holds e(S m , P ) = e(H 2 (m), P P ub ) This scheme is proven to be secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen message attack (in random oracle model) assuming Computationally Diffie Hellman Problem is hard [8] .
[Setup] The system parameters params = {G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, H 1 , H 2 } Let Alice be the original signer with public key P K o = s o P and private key s o , and L = {P S i } be the set of proxy signers with public key P K p i = s p i P and private key s p i .
[Proxy Key Generation] The original signer prepares a warrant w, which is explicit description of the delegation relation. Then he sends (w, s o H 2 (w)) to the proxy group L. Each proxy signer uses his secret key S p i to sign the warrant w and gets his proxy key S i = s o H 2 (w)+s p i H 2 (w).
[Proxy Ring Signing]For signing any message m, the proxy signer P S i chooses a subset L′ ⊆ L. Proxy signers's public key is listed in L ′ . Now to sign he/ she perform following operations:
-Initialization: Choose randomly an element A ∈ G 1 , compute
-Generate forward ring sequence For i = k + 1, k + 2, ....k + (n − 1) choose randomly T i ∈ G 1 and compute
-Forming the ring: Let R n = R o . Then, P S i computes
-Output: Finally, Let c n = c 0 . The resulting ring signature for a message m and with ring member specified by L′ is the (n + 1)-tuple:(c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n , T )
[Verification] Given message m, its ring signature (c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n , T ), and the set L′ of the identities of all ring members, the verifier can check the validity of the signature by the testing if:
Key Secrecy In computing user P i 's private key S i from the corresponding public key P K o + P K P i requires the knowledge of original signer's private key s o and proxy signer's private key s p i . According to definition these keys are protected under the intractability of DLP in G 1 as P K o = s o P and P K P i = s p i P .
Signer ambiguity In a valid proxy ring signature (c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n , T ) with proxy group L ′ generated by P S i all c i 's are computed by eq 2. Since T i ∈ G 1 is chosen uniformly at random, each c i is uniformly distributed over G 2 . Thus, regardless who the actual signer is and how many ring members involved (c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n ) biases to no specific ring member.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a new proxy ring signature which becomes needful whenever proxy signer want to sign message on behalf of the original signer providing anonymity. The proposed scheme is more efficient as compared with the Zhang et al.'s, especially for the pairing operation required in the signature verification. This proxy ring signature scheme is more efficient for those verifiers who have limited computing power.
